The Weakness of the Iranian Regime

The Weakness of the Iranian Regime

Gilbert Achcar

I began my article a week ago with a famous saying by Saint-Just, one of the most prominent leaders of the French Revolution, introducing what I described as a historical lesson stated as follows: “Those who engage in armed conflicts and confrontations half-heartedly against people they have declared to be their absolute enemies, thus inducing in these enemies a determination to crush them in return, are doomed to defeat” (“Iran’s regime in a predicament of its own making“, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 17 June 2025). I then went on describing some examples of the Iranian regime’s weak resolve, which has been and continues to be evident on various occasions, in its custom of doing things halfway and in the great gap separating its bombastic statements from its muted actions, in confronting the two states it has declared as absolute enemies since its inception: the United States and Israel, the “Great Satan” and the “Little Satan” as it has called them.

Just a few days after that article, we saw the most striking illustration of the above in Tehran’s behaviour toward Washington. When the Israeli threat against it escalated on the backdrop of the faltering negotiations between its government and Donald Trump’s administration, the Islamic Republic promised that it would consider the United States complicit in any Israeli aggression against it (which is the very truth, regardless of the illusions of those who believe in the sincerity of Donald Trump’s pacifist discourse), and that its response would consequently include US interests in the region among its targets. Then came the Israeli aggression, during whose first ten days the Zionist state destroyed a significant portion of Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities and assassinated an astounding number of its military and security leaders and of those overseeing its nuclear program. In its retaliation, Tehran did not fire a single bullet at any of the US bases spread across the Gulf region, nor did it allow any of its regional auxiliaries to attack or even threaten these bases or other regional symbols of US hegemony—neither the Lebanese Hezbollah, nor the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, nor even the Yemeni Houthi Ansar Allah.

When Trump himself began hinting at joining his ally Benjamin Netanyahu in attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, to complete what Israel had begun by letting US forces use means that the Zionist state does not possess (GBU-57 guided bombs, each weighing more than 12 tons, and stealth B-2 aircrafts capable of carrying them), Tehran again threatened that its response would be massive. This time, the Houthis even promised to bomb US ships in the Red Sea if the United States attacked Iran.

Occurring overnight Sunday into Monday, the US onslaught complemented the Israeli aggression as expected. Tehran responded in a manner that occasioned a historical precedent: that of the attacked party thanking the attacker. Indeed, Trump thanked the Iranian regime for its generous advance warning of the impending attack, which resulted in no significant damage to the targeted US base. Unsurprisingly, the Houthi menace proved to be an empty threat, not backed by any action.

The difference is strikingly significant between the behaviour of the Islamic Republic in its early stages—when its determination to confront the United States was made evident by delivering truly painful blows to the superpower, beginning with the siege of its embassy in Tehran following the victory of the Khomeinist Revolution in 1979 and culminating in the deadly attack on the Marine base in Beirut (241 dead) in 1983—and its behaviour in recent years, manifested in its lack of response to the successive strikes launched by the Zionist state against its forces deployed in Syria, and then its muted retaliation, when the limit of its toleration was exceeded with the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus last year, on the first of April, leading to the killing of several senior Revolutionary Guard officers. Tehran’s response to that bombing followed the pattern seen in Monday’s attack on the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar: the Islamic Republic gave Washington advance warning of its imminent action, through the Qatari authorities. The attack thus resulted in only very limited effect.

This pattern of notifying the enemy of an imminent attack so they can prepare for it in a way that minimizes the damage to themselves was inaugurated with Iran’s response to the first Trump administration’s assassination in Iraq, in early 2020, of Qassem Soleimani, then-commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Tehran notified the US forces, through the Baghdad government, to prepare for an attack on its forces deployed on Iraqi soil. The result was limited to several US soldiers suffering from trauma caused by the blast of explosions at Ain al-Asad Air Base, prompting Trump to declare that the Iranian retaliation was so muted that there was no need to respond. This scenario was repeated on Monday, leading Trump to thank Tehran and declare the end of the fighting and the establishment of a comprehensive peace between Israel and Iran.

This “peace”—which would be more appropriately termed a truce, if the ceasefire actually holds (which has not yet been confirmed as of this writing)—won’t last if Washington does not reach an agreement with Tehran. Trump is clearly betting that the painful blows Israel has dealt to the Iranian regime, and his own demonstration of his willingness to directly engage his forces in aggression alongside his Zionist ally, will persuade Tehran to abandon its commitment to uranium enrichment and the manufacture of long-range missiles. The Trump administration has made abandoning these two activities a condition for a new agreement with the Islamic Republic that would include lifting the economic sanctions imposed on it. This is but the old policy of “carrot and stick”, beating the opponent while promising to reward them if they surrender. We are hence back to square one in the latest round of confrontation between Iran and the US-Israeli alliance, with Tehran still facing the dilemma of choosing between war and surrender. It has thus far tried in vain to find a middle ground where it would grant some concessions without completely losing face.

The major difference between the Iranian regime’s behaviour in its early years and its behaviour in recent years clearly stems from the difference between a regime that, at its inception, enjoyed overwhelming popular support and a regime that has largely lost this loyalty and is no longer confident in its ability to control its society, which has been going through successive uprisings for several years. In following the half-hearted behaviour described in last week’s article, the Iranian regime, since the start of the Zionist genocidal war in Gaza, has resorted to mobilizing its Lebanese and Yemeni auxiliaries, thus exposing them to the risk of retaliation, without itself daring to enter the battle. When the battle caught up with it despite its caution, due to the Zionist state’s boundless aggressivity, it was weak in confronting it (despite its claims, similar to those of yesterday’s Arab nationalist regimes that used to claim victory while in the throes of defeat) and cowardly in confronting its US patron. Such behaviour invites the aggressors to double their pressure and renew their aggression, confident that Tehran will not dare carry out its threat to deflagrate the entire region and seriously attack US bases and interests spread across it.

Translated from the Arabic original published in Al-Quds al-Arabi on 24 June 2025. Feel free to republish or publish in other languages, with mention of the source.